Conservative columnist George Will has published a column that, fundamentally, gives up on the war in Afghanistan. The column has produced a storm of controversy among conservatives, with some in favor but most attacking Will. From some of the reaction, one would think that Will is the conservative version of Medea Benjamin of Code Pink. I think that Will raises some valid points but that his solution is a non-solution.
Will points to the backwardness of Afghanistan to argue that the basic premise for nation-building and for successful counterinsurgency is the ability to provide security. Right now, the Americans and their NATO allies can do neither, despite the presence of more than 100,000 troops. Americans are tiring of the war, while the body count goes up. Yet success there would require presence for more than a decade and a far more massive commitment of troops.
Will urges that “forces should be substantially reduced to serve a comprehensively revised policy: America should do only what can be done from offshore, using intelligence, drones, cruise missiles, airstrikes and small, potent Special Forces units, concentrating on the porous 1,500-mile border with Pakistan, a nation that actually matters.”
I have some thoughts about Afghanistan. One of the themes commonly heard is that Afghanistan is ungovernable within and unconquerable from without. Therefore, it is said, our effort is bound to fail, as was the Soviets’. Those sentiments have some support in the current facts on the ground. First, Afghanistan is notoriously backward in many parts and its terrain difficult to traverse, as Michael Yon has so well illustrated. This may put modern militaries at a disadvantage if they seek to rely on traditional modes of movement and occupation.
Second, with few exceptions, the NATO forces are, as Mark Steyn has satirized, bound by rules of engagement that make them close to useless. The German forces are so hemmed in by restrictions, it isn’t clear that things wouldn’t be better if they just got out of the way. It certainly doesn’t add to the militaries’ respect for each other, a respect that is necessary if there is going to be a coordinated process toward a uniform goal.
But I differ with the assertion that, judging by history, Afghanistan cannot be militarily controlled. We are not the Soviets, whose theory of massed brutal warfare was blunted by the Afghanis’ willingness to absorb huge losses. Afghani families are large; Russian families not. If an Afghani son is killed in a family of six children, the personal tragedy to the family, culturally already accustomed to the constant presence of death and privation, is less than to the Russian family where he may well be the only child. Over time, the Soviet method of warfare ironically favored the prey more than the predator.
We are not the Soviets, and our own theory of warfare is more conscious of protecting life, ours and theirs. Sometimes perhaps too much so. Thus we have different, and more sophisticated ways, of controlling a population, usually through political and economic tactics. The old “Win their hearts and minds” policy, in contrast to the Russian “When you’ve got ‘em by the ba**s, their hearts and minds will follow” doctrine.
Moreover, the lesson of history is decidedly mixed. Alexander, the Persian kings, and the Mogul Emperors all controlled at least large parts of Afghanistan for considerable periods. In the 19th and 20th centuries, British imperial policy combined military and political efforts to establish some semblance of influence over swaths of Afghanistan. True, the British shunned direct occupation, thereby avoiding the military and economic sacrifices that would have entailed. But they did so also to create a buffer zone and avoid having a direct border between British India and the Russian Empire. They created and maintained an Afghani buffer state, or buffer fiefdoms. It was a hard-headed, non-prettified realpolitik of doing business with unsavory characters in pursuit of the more important geopolitical goal. It isn’t clear that we have the stomach for that today. But it can be done. To the extent Britain relied on military forces, they made extensive use of local allies and auxiliaries. That is generally a smart imperial policy.
As to governance, it is always the case that the population, especially in countries with no democratic tradition, will lean towards the strong horse that is most likely to provide security to live their lives. The Americans have a reputation, nurtured by anti-war movements since Vietnam, of unreliability and lack of staying power. That, in turn, creates a self-reinforcing cycle of skepticism, lack of local support, disappointment, lack of progress, collapse of American domestic support, and failure. Cultures who are not accustomed to spectacles of open debate over such issues misread these protests. The enemy is only too glad to assist in promoting those mistaken views of a superpower whose aura of invicibility is a mirage.
Will is correct, then, in having serious doubts about the success of our mission militarily and politically. I don’t know what the fine details for success are in Afghanistan. The military and political experts are in the proper pay grade for that; I’m not. But Will’s “solution” isn’t one. Lobbing cruise missiles from offshore is not a long-term strategy. Using special forces launched from naval units for the periodic hit-and-run is disastrous. Such forces need information and support that is not easily provided on an ongoing basis from ships or foreign bases. Maintaining the occasional base or retaining Bagram as a mission center would be impossible without military control and local political support, both unlikely in an Afghanistan largely controlled by the Taliban.
By the way, the trial balloons floated by candidate Obama’s team that we could deal with moderate elements of the Taliban is unlikely, as well. Better to boost the corrupt warlords whose alliance is only a matter of getting the price right. As the Iran experience should show by now, even the “moderate” true believers still wish our destruction and are themselves hemmed in by the political reality of militant hate for Western secular humanism in which they operate.
There is a wonderful book by Lt. Col. John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife. He is a counterinsurgency expert. He argues that, based on the experience of the British in Malaya and the French in Algeria, the key to fighting insurgencies (usually a long-term project) is to blend into, and gain the trust of, the population, to operate in smaller mobile units rather than as a major visible occupation army, to retain command flexibility to respond quickly to changing conditions, and to rely on trained local units. The goal here is to provide enough security to buy time to let the appropriate political forces mature and gain the upper hand. The end solution is a political victory that deprives the insurgents of popular support. Similar tactics worked for the U.S. in the Philippines and their absence plagued the American effort in Vietnam.
If Nagl is correct, and history seems to bear him out, the way not to be successful is Will’s way. This last point is one also made by John Noonan of The Weekly Standard.