If it is true that those who can, do; and those who cannot do, teach; then it is certain that those who cannot do or teach, administer; and those who cannot administer, work for the government.
Perusing the newspapers, one finds articles that bear witness to supposedly reckless lenders who lent funds to irresponsible borrowers living beyond their means. Then there are the stories of greedy speculators who produced a “bubble” in real estate through the creation of complicated derivatives that were disseminated to greedy and gullible investors (read, banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, pension funds) in a market that lacked transparency and accountability. Finally, there are the tales of various industries, notably the auto industry, whose lack of managerial foresight and technological adaptability has brought them to the brink of financial ruin.
Leave aside for now the role of government with its ill-conceived subsidies, myriad regulations, and ideologically-driven mandates. Let us also leave aside the hysterical reporting by the press and the political opportunism of Democratic partisans (and, it must be said, some like-minded or fearful Republicans) in creating a perception of apocalyptic disaster among the public that likely has contributed to the severity of current economic conditions. What is the “cure” for these evils that are said to have produced a credit crunch and a severe recession, if not a repeat of the Great Depression? The nearly universal response of the political class and their media and academic allies has been for the federal government to act. And to act boldly and quickly.
In real terms, that has meant a precipitous rush to entrenching a federal government that is living even further beyond its means than typical. It has produced a series of huge and complex maneuvers to deal with the credit crunch through transactions that, judging by what has happened so far, require no accountability and utterly lack transparency. Finally, there are increasingly bizarre calls for bail-outs of those same inefficient industries, plus numerous others, in an incipient industrial policy whose scope is exceeded only by its recklessness. In other words, the government proposes to do what it accuses private business of having done that has caused financial calamity. But the government promises to do it on a more massive scale.
All of this is premised on the supposition that the pain of what is essentially a process of asset revaluation can be avoided with just the right dose of the right fiscal medicine now that the supply of monetary medicine has been effectively exhausted. Then, as various fiscal medicines are tried and fail, there is a two-fold response. Let’s increase the dosage and let’s also administer different medicine. Little consideration is given to the notion that even medicine that might be beneficial at a certain dosage can become toxic at a higher level, and that medicine that is curative on its own can be neutralized or even become harmful in combination with others. Apparently, the mindset is to continue this process until the patient’s symptoms get better, whether that improvement is due to the medicine or occurs despite the medicine. That the treatment might kill the patient, and that alleviating the symptom does not necessarily mean curing the disease, is disregarded.
A fundamental problem here is the faith that, in this matter, macro-economic laws work mysteriously differently than micro-economic actions. Let’s think about an individual who is in debt and has a temporary liquidity problem. That person might take on a loan if he can be reasonably certain that his liquidity issues will be resolved shortly. Businesses with recurring financing needs may obtain “bridge loans” or, if they can, market short-term commercial paper to cover their needs. But, again, those actions are based on short-term considerations and on reasonable certainty, perhaps based on prior experience, that the specific need is temporary. If that individual or business cannot be sure the liquidity situation is temporary, a strategy to recovery based on borrowing himself out of illiquidity would be derided as folly. The borrower would quickly find lenders to be unwilling to lend and investors to invest. Instead, he would be advised to sell assets on the market, raise his income by getting another job or increasing sales, or, if necessary, proceed as swiftly as possible to bankruptcy court for an unwinding of his assets and liabilities. Those who had invested or lent to him previously would be forced to accept the hazards of lending and investing. And anyone lending to such individuals or investing in their effforts at that stage would be considered foolish.
Why would this be any different for a collection of large borrowers (banks) than for individuals and other businesses? And why would anyone think that the process of bringing the individual’s ability to own assets in line with his ability to pay for them would be anything but painful? If the individual has to sell the assets quickly, he may not get the same amount that he paid for them, or even what he owes on them. But the process allows the individual to bring himself into a position where he once again is able to act productively for himself and his community. The same goes for the banks.
Instead, the government is going to strew increasingly stratospheric amounts of cash around economic activity. At best, this would be limited to financial institutions either to get them to lend directly and thereby resolve the liquidity problems, or to straighten out their balance sheets and thereby to get them to lend to each other. At worst, this would be passed around to other firms as an industrial policy that has been tried so often and failed it is a wonder anyone still proposes it without triggering a storm of jeers.
The problem of course is that this strategy ultimately cannot avoid the underlying problem, namely, the need to revalue assets in real terms to what people can afford to pay, and thereby will pay, for them. The assumption is that this is all a temporary dislocation. If this proves false, and government intervention is likely to make it such by postponing the day of reckoning, the duration of the misery is extended unnecessarily.
Moreover, the government has to finance its efforts, just as an individual or business. What the government is betting is that the laws of micro-economic behavior don’t apply to it as a macro-economic actor. What false conceit. ”Government” is not productive. It takes wealth from those who are productive and gives it to others. Sometimes that is done to pay for the operations of government. This is especially important when government pays for the military in times of war. One problem with such wealth transfer is that, as government gets into areas best left to private enterprise, its activities produce less value in relation to what it takes from private persons than if the activity were left in the hands of private business.
Another and all too frequent problem is that government often takes from those who are productive and gives to those whose main goal is to gain a subsidy for activities that could not get financial support in open competition for resources. There are a very few debatable exceptions, such as protection for infant industries that might be considered somewhat analogous to patents and copyrights. But in most instances, whether through outright corruption or more ambiguous “influence,” this rent-seeking political class crowds out resources that would be put to more productive and beneficial use by private enterprise operating in the open market.
Finally, and most important, government must first have funds before it can spend. Again, government itself is not productive, so it must get the funds from (forced) investors through taxes, from lenders by borrowing, or by printing money. If government raises taxes, it prevents those taxpayers from using the money to buy things and spur economic activity through the efficient allocation by the market. It also prevents taxpayers from investing that money in private ventures to spur economic growth. Either one is especially bad when the business cycle is in a downturn and cash is comparatively valuable.
If government opts, instead of taxing, to borrow the funds, it necessarily competes with private borrowers and relies on the willingness of lenders to lend. This is especially troublesome in a downturn when cash is valuable and when assets are declining in relative value. With lenders reluctant to lend when balance sheets are uncertain, the cost of credit goes up. If demand for cash increases through government borrowing, interest rates go even higher. And that interest must be paid, beginning immediately, thereby requiring government to raise more taxes or to finance the cost of its borrowing with more borrowing. All of this stymies productive and innovative private economic activity that is most likely to reverse the economic slide quickly. While the U.S. government, with the dollar as the world reserve currency, is in a better position to borrow from the rest of the world than are other governments, the U.S., too, faces limits when the rest of the world is in a downturn and capital is increasingly scarce. After all, China is also experiencing massive economic problems as demand for its exports slows and the supply of dollars it needs to park in the U.S. dwindles. So, to avoid throttling the more productive private economy, government, like any private individual, must tighten its belt rather than get outside investment (tax revenue) or loans.
That leaves the printing of money, which appears to be the preferred method currently. But money is just paper whose value depends on the trust people place in it as a medium of exchange for other things. The more money floats around with productivity and wealth unchanged or, worse, declining, the less the value of money becomes. Each unit of money represents a smaller amount of things for which it can be exchanged. At some point, the whole psychology regarding the money changes and an “inverse bubble” develops in regard to the money. Anyone for buying Zimbabwe dollars?
Now, the U.S. in a deflationary cycle can afford to print money, and that is the Keynesian response. After all, money is expensive in regards to other assets. But if the government keeps printing money after that strategy or other events have reversed the downturn, inflation looms. At that point, if the government and the Federal Reserve time everything right, they have to pull the money out of circulation by raising interest rates and taxes, which, in turn, increases the possibility of causing the downturn that government had just tried to avoid.
That is if everything is timed right. If not, there is a danger of inflation taking off. And the likelihood of failure is greater, the more drastic the government’s injection of money was. Think of this as a sort of leveraging. The more paper the government creates in relation to the country’s true productivity and asset value, the more quickly and drastically the government must lower the money supply and the greater the damage from a misstep. It is said that we are in a deflationary cycle right now. Perhaps. But then why isn’t the price of gold falling drastically in relation to cash? Gold, after all, is essentially just another medium of exchange. It must be that many people are concerned that the government will not be successful in controlling the flow of cash, and that the dollar will become less valuable in the near to medium term.
With all of these uncertainties and risk, there seems to be little benefit from this massive government interference. A historical precedent illustrates the problem. Through missteps, such as restrictions on the money supply during the latter part of the Hoover administration and in 1937, tax increases on capital and the wealthy, and protectionism such as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, Congress and the FDR administration worsened and prolonged the economic downturn. The administration’s tax policies reduced capital formation. Its protectionist policies and industrial policies in favor of large cartels and against price discounting kept business from lowering the costs of its products. The administration’s agricultural policies kept those products’ prices artificially high at a time that people were going hungry, thereby “necessitating” more government expenditures. Its pro-union and minimum wage policies kept wages artificially high, thereby preventing a revaluation of the asset of labor. Overall, these policies reduced the incentive for entrepreneurial risk-taking and for job creation. The labor force remained stagnant and unemployment remained high until the massive World War II military draft reduced unemployment at least nominally.
If the important first step right now is to resolve the liquidity problem, and get banks to lend to each other, policies that prevent a revaluation of assets will only drag out the inevitable. There are different ways to address the liquidity issue. The direct approach of having government inject funds into banks in exchange for preferred stock turned out not to work because, rather than lend to other institutions of unknown financial solidity, banks hoarded the funds (much as taxpayers did with the 2008 “stimulus” payments) to shore up their own balance sheets.
Alternatively, government can collect the “bad assets” from the banks (the original TARP plan) so that banks can be assured that the remaining assets are solid and provide a basis for renewed flow of inter-bank lending that will then also loosen credit for other borrowers. In the absence of a market, the problem is trying to value those “toxic” assets. Indeed, there is an initial problem of even identifying what they are. What level of, for example, mortgages are sufficiently “risky” to qualify? And what about student loans, credit cards, and commercial paper? If government offers the banks too little, why would the banks sell those assets? If government offers too much, the taxpayers’ exposure is increased. And there really is no valuation mechanism, because of the complexity and lack of transparency of many of the exotic assets derived from the original mortgages.
Congress could, of course, nationalize the banks or force them to surrender identified loans. Leave aside constitutional issues. Unless the government wants to undertake complete and long-term nationalization, the valuation problem remains. And a policy of total nationalization that would extend to that great majority of banks that are sound, with the destruction of shareholder value that entails, would make future investment and lending that much riskier and expensive. Venezuela, anyone?
The best valuation alternative, then, would be to have the private sector sort this out, with the assistance of the bankruptcy courts. With no government bail-out in the offing, companies would not be able to prolong the agony by hiding their difficulties and falsely boosting their balance sheets with taxpayer funds. There would be no wealth transfer from taxpayers to shareholders and creditors. Since matters would be resolved fairly quickly, the danger from an attack on a healthy institution by speculative short-sellers would be lessened. Banks would seek bankruptcy protection. Some would be reorganized. Some would be liquidated. The toxic assets would be auctioned off at a price at which someone is willing to take the risk. This would begin to set a floor for those assets. That would facilitate the process of economic recovery, even if, years down the road, it may be determined that the floor was unduly pessimistic out of an excess of caution. And the risk would be born by private investors, not taxpayers.
Despite my skepticism, I was initially supportive of an emergency injection of cash for the banks to lend. But as the price tag exploded and the time frame expanded; as the financial injection caused banks to protect their balance sheets rather than unfreeze credit; as the somewhat defensible assistance to the financial sector turned into an indefensible industrial policy; as a targeted program metastasised into a political pork barrel; as a plan said to rescue a pillar of capitalism became an obvious attempt to restructure the entire system in favor of failed doctrines of, at best, state-directed capitalism; and as those left with vast and arguably unconstitutional discretion to administer the plan acted in contradictory and confusing manner suggestive of panic and clueless experimentation, I became convinced that my initial skepticism was correct. The government needs to stay out and let the market set the asset values. Then, once the shake-out has occurred, and the government is not simply creating a new asset bubble, the usual monetary policy rules may again apply in a chastened lending environment.
In some future posts, I will link to articles by various economists that explore the points I have raised in this posting. As I am not a trained economist, I have been pleased to see professionals raise some of these same concerns.